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Strand: Divorce Law—Equitable Distribution of Appreciated Nonmarital Prop

CASE NOTE

Divorce Law - EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF APPRECIATED NONMARITAL
PROPERTY: Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184 (Minn. 1987).
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently considered whether appreciated nonmarital property should be shared upon divorce., The
court held that marital property, which is subject to equitable division, includes the increase in value of nonmarital property attributable to the application of marital funds or to the efforts of one or both
spouses. 2 The court's holding in Nardini v. Nardini3 ignores the plain
language of Minnesota's maintenance, support and property statute. 4 The court fashioned a rule in harmony with the policy behind
5
the statute's enactment.
Minnesota is one of many states which have enacted legislation
based upon the doctrine of equitable distribution.6 This doctrine
recognizes the contributions made by each spouse to the marriage
and calls for an equitable division of marital property. 7 The language of Minnesota's statute classifies property as either marital or
nonmarital. 8 Property acquired during the marriage is classified as
1. See Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184 (Minn. 1987).

2. Id. at 192.
3.

Id.

4. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
5. The statute, when read at face value, would exclude from equitable distribution all increases in value of property acquired before the marriage . The Nardini
court instead focused on Minnesota Statutes Section 518.58, which requires the court
to make a "just and equitable division of the marital property of the parties ... "
That section also provides that the court may apportion nonmarital property to prevent unfair hardship. MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1986 & Supp. 1987). The supreme
court also noted that the uniform act, upon which Minnesota's statute is based, no
longer refers to marital and nonmarital property. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 191-92; see
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 239 (1987) (hereinafter UMDA).
6. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.54 (1986 & Supp. 1987). For a discussion of

caselaw and legislation enacted in other states, see Freed & Walker, Family Law in the
Fifty States: An Overview, 19 FAM. L. Q. 331 (1986).

7. Equitable distribution reforms the common law approach which allocated
property solely on the basis of title. This system discriminated against the homemaker by awarding all of the property to the spouse who had directly acquired it. See
L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.01, at 1-3 (1983); Krauskopf, A
Theory For 'Just" Division of Marital Property In Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REV. 165, 168
(1976). See, e.g., Note, The Need to Value Homemaker Services Upon Divorce, 87 W. VA. L.
REV. 115, 121 (1984).

8. Minnesota Statutes Section 518.54, subdivision 5 provides, in pertinent part,
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marital and is to be divided equitably between the parties, regardless
of title. 9 Nonmarital property, which includes "property real or personal ...

acquired before the marriage ...

or the increase in value

[of that property]... "10 is not to be divided. The statute makes no
distinctions based upon the reasons for an increase in value.t' The
doctrine of equitable distribution is not new to Minnesota.12 The
Nardini decision is significant, however, because it creates appreciation distinctions not found in the statute.' 3 These distinctions
4
strengthen the statutory presumption in favor of marital property,'
and will ultimately result in more equitable property distributions.15
Despite its contradiction of express statutory language, the Nardini
decision is important to any practitioner attempting to understand
this changing area of the law.
Under the common law approach to distribution, no rights to
property arose because of the marriage itself.16 A husband owned
All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage and
before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in a form of
co-ownership ....
The presumption of marital property is overcome by a
showing that the property is nonmarital property.
"Nonmarital property" means property real or personal, acquired by
either spouse before, during, or after the existence of their marriage, which
(a) is acquired as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance made by a third
party to one but not to the other spouse;
(b) is acquired before the marriage;
(c) is acquired in exchange for or is the increase in value of property
which is described in clauses (a), (b), (d), and (e);
(d) is acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation; or
(e) is excluded by a valid antenuptial contract.
MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subd. 5 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Minnesota's Marriage and Divorce Act, modeled after the UMDA, went into
effect in 1979. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 772, § 48, 1978 Minn. Laws 1062, 1081 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 518.54 (1986 & Supp. 1987)).
13. The statute allows all increases in value of nonmarital property to be excluded from equitable distribution. Id. The Nardini court drew distinctions between
increases which occurred because of the efforts of the parties and those increases in
value which occurred because of the nature of the property itself. Nardini, 414
N.W.2d at 191.
14. Minnesota Statutes Section 518.54 contains a presumption in favor of marital
property classification. This presumption is overcome, however, by a showing that
the property is nonmarital. MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subd. 5 (1986 & Supp. 1987).
15. See id. Without the distinction created by the supreme court, the exceptions
to distribution found in subdivision 5 would negate the equitable policy which is the
foundation of Minnesota's divorce act. See id. Statutory exceptions to overall policy
are to be narrowly construed. See MINN. STAT. § 645.19 (1986). Compare Flynn v.
Flynn, 402 N.W.2d 111 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (Flynn set a precendent for permanent
maintenance in Minnesota, and is reflective of the legislature's intent to protect parties to lengthy marriages).
16. Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 167.
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all of his wife's possessions and could make use of her real property.' 7 A wife could only obtain title to marital property if she survived her husband.' 8 In the nineteenth century, Married Women's
Property Acts were enacted granting women the right to own their
own property.19 No property interest arose, however, because of the
marriage; if property was titled in the husband's name, it belonged to
him.20
The doctrine of equitable distribution arose in the twentieth century as a legal response to the social, cultural and political changes
which have taken place in this country.2 1 By the 1930's, seventeen
states had some form of equitable distribution.22 In 1970, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the original draft of
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA)23 as a means of solving many of the inequities which existed in marriage and divorce
laws. 24 "[T]he Act provided that distribution of property upon divorce should be treated similar [sic] to the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership."25
The original draft of the UMDA created a dual property system,
establishing marital and separate property. 26 Property characterized
17. "The wife's only interest in the property of her husband was her dower,
which depended on her surviving her husband." Note, supra note 7, at 115.
18. Id.
19. Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 167.
20. Id. "The principal flaw in common law concepts governing distribution of
property upon divorce is that judicial inquiry generally focuses upon the situs of title
to the marital assets to the exclusion of any consideration of the relative contributions of the marital partners.
.." Harris, The Arkansas Marital Property Statute and the
Arkansas Appellate Courts: Tiptoeing Together Through the Tulips, 7 U. ARK. LrrrtE ROCK
L.J. 1, 2 (1984).
21. These changes include the rise of the women's movement, the redefinition of
traditional male and female roles within marriage and the dramatic rise in the divorce
rate. GOLDEN, supra note 7, § 1.01, at 2.
22. Id. § 1.02, at 3.
23. Id. The UMDA served as a model classification scheme for many states. Section 307 of the Model Act provided that "marital property" means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or
descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by a valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 307 (1970). The original draft of section 307
also contained a rebuttable presumption in favor of marital property.
24. Note, supra note 7, at 122; e.g., Krauskopf, supra note 7, at 166; Note, Divorce
and the Division of MaritalProperty in Arkansas - Equal or Equitable? 35 ARK. L. REV. 671,
678-79 (1982).
25. Note, supra note 7, at 122.
26. "The... power to divide property was not extended to all property (includ-
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as marital would be divided between the parties, while nonmarital
property would be excluded from division.27 In 1973, the Commissioners revised the Act to create alternative proposals.2 8 The recommended alternative no longer distinguishes nonmarital from marital
property.2 9 It states that a court shall equitably apportion between
the parties "the property and assets belonging to either or both howof the
ever and whenever acquired .... "30 Thus, the revised version
3'
distribution.
equitable
to
property
all
UMDA would subject
Many states have enacted equitable distribution statutes based
upon the original draft of the UMDA.32 These statutes classify property into two categories: property subject to distribution (marital
property) and property which is not (separate or nonmarital prop34
erty).3 3 Often these statutes define marital and separate property.
Other statutes define one class of property with the residue falling
into the other class. 35 Certain states have created distribution statutes with a presumption favoring marital property. 3 6 In states without statutory presumptions, courts have created marital
ing separate property) owned by the spouses because the shared enterprise or partnership theory is inherently applicable only to property acquired during the marriage
through the effort of the spouses." Krauskopf, note 7, at 173.
27. Id.
28. Alternative A of revised section 307 does not refer to marital and nonmarital
property. It provides for an equitable distribution of the parties' property, whenever
and however acquired. Alternative B follows the originial draft of section 307. It was
created for those states which prefer to adhere to the dual classification system.
UMDA § 307, comment, at 314 (1973). The Commissioners felt that the dual classification system hindered the cause of equitable distribution because it excludes some
property from division. Id.
29. Several other state statutes allow their courts to allocate nonmarital property
on an ad hoc method. GOLDEN, supra note 7, § 5.02, at 94 n. 6. UMDA, § 307, 9A
U.L.A. at 238-40 (1987). "In spite of the Commissioners' admonitions, only Montana has adopted this version of § 307." Id.
30. UMDA § 307, Commissioners' Comment 1973, 9A U.L.A. at 142.
31.

Id.

32. Forty-eight states plus the District of Columbia have enacted some form of
equitable distribution legislation based upon the UMDA. See McLindon, Separate But
Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce For Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.

Q. 351

(1987).
33. This dual classification system is derived from the community property doctrine which is based on a scheme of dual classification. However, "[e]quitable distribution differs from pure community property in that the division of property should
be equitable and not necessarily equal." GOLDEN, supra note 7, § 2.01, at 18-19.
34. See, e.g., ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
para. 503 (Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981).
35. See Note, supra note 7, at 122.
36. Some states apply this presumption to property acquired subsequent to the
marriage, others apply it to property acquired during the marriage. See Graham, Using Formulas to Separate Maritaland Nonmarital Property: A Policy Oriented Approach to the
Division of Appreciated Property Upon Divorce, 73 Ky. L.J. 41, 44 (1984).
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presumptions themselves.37
The precise issue in Nardini was the classification of separate property that had increased in value during the marriage.3 8 Other jurisdictions have resolved the issue in differing ways.39 Some courts use
an "inception of title" approach, characterizing property at the moment title is acquired.40 Others have adopted the "source of funds"
rule, characterizing property as each payment towards its acquisition
is made. 4 1 Still other jurisdictions employ a "transmutation" approach.4 2 This classifies property on the basis of the parties'
intent.43
Minnesota is generally considered to be a source of
funds/allocation jurisdiction.44 However, the simplistic language- of
our statute has resulted in a confused standard of allocation.45 The
Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to resolve the confusion when
it decided Schmitz v. Schmitz.46 The Schmitz' acquired their home by
making an $8,000 downpayment from the husband's nonmarital
funds.4 7 The remaining mortgage was paid with marital funds.48
37. See Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 217, 320 A.2d 484, 495 (1974).
38. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 190.
39. See Note, Equitable Distribution:Approaches To Apportionment, 87 W. VA. L. REV.
95, 97 (1984).
40. See In re Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866, 872-75 (Mo. 1976) (marital funds used in
mortgage payments did not alter status of nonmarital property). The Missouri
Supreme Court has since abandoned this inception of title approach in favor of the
"source of funds" rule. See In re Hoffman, 676 S.W.2d 817, 825 (Mo. 1984).
41. A single item of property may be to some extent nonmarital and the remainder marital. "The divorce court must, therefore, separate marital and nonmarital
property by tracing from the evidence adduced the contributions each may have
made to the acquisition of a particular item." Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 75
(Me. 1979); e.g., Brandenburg v. Brandendurg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981);
Hall v. Hall, 462 A.2d 1179 (Me. 1983); Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916
(1982).
42. The status of property can be altered by evidence that the parties intended
such a result. Courts have found a change in the character of property through commingling or joint use of marital and separate property. Courts which use the "source
of funds" approach, see supra note 41, have little need for transmutation, as they allocate property between marital and nonmarital interests. See In Re Marriage of Smith,
86 11. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981) (failure of nonmarital property holder to
segregate property gave rise to transmutation).
43. The evidence necessary to prove transmutation varies from court to court.
See generally, GOLDEN, supra note 7, § § 5.33-.34, at 132-34; Note, supra note 39, at
101-03.
44. See, GOLDEN, supra note 7, § 5.32, at 131.
45. Although the statute contains a presumption in favor of marital property,
subdivision 5(c) indicates that any increase in value to nonmarital property will be
excluded from the marital estate. MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subd. 5(c) (1986 & Supp.
1987). This language suggests a "title" approach to distribution, despite the intent
of the drafters to promote equitable distribution along partnership lines. See id.
46. 309 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 1981).
47. Id.
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Mr. Schmitz relied upon the statute, which characterizes property acquired in exchange for nonmarital property as nonmarital.49 The
court, however, focused on a decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals,50 and held that the increase in equity should be apportioned
between marital and nonmarital interests.51
Subsequently, the court decided Brown v. Brown 52 and Faus v.
Faus.5 3 These cases reiterated the Schmitz source of payments rule,54
and added that sums expended for improvements to nonmarital
property were attributable to the efforts of the parties' and constituted marital property. 55 Despite the holdings in Schmitz, Brown, and
Faus, the lower courts remained uncertain of the proper allocation
standard.5 6 This uncertainty was largely due to the conflict between
the court's interpretation of the statute and the plain meaning of the

statute.57

Minnesota's dissolution statute provides that nonmarital property
includes the increase in value of nonmarital property. 58 The Schmitz
decision, however, suggested a distinction between increases in
48. The balance of the purchase price of $38,000 was $30,000. Id. at 748.
49. Id. at 750. See supra note 8.

50. At the time of trial the homestead had a market value of $79,300, yet Mr.
Schmitz argued that the property was entirely nonmarital because of his $8,000
downpayment. Reliance on Minnesota's statutory language would have resulted in
an unjust result. Instead, the court based its decision on Woosnam v. Woosnam, 587
S.W.2d 262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), in its recognition of "the marital character of appreSchmitz, 309
ciation attributable to the joint or team efforts of the spouses .....
N.W.2d at 750.
51. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d at 750.
52. 316 N.W.2d 552 (Minn: 1982).
53. 319 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1982).
54. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d at 750. The court articulated the "Schmitz rule" in
Brown:

The present value of a nonmarital asset used in the acquisition of marital
property is the proportion the net equity or contribution at the time of acquisition bore to the value of the property at the time of purchase multiplied
by the value of the property at the time of separation.
Brown, 316 N.W.2d at 553.
55. Id. at 553-54.
56. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 388 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(growth of husband's profit sharing fund marital in character); Doering v. Doering,
385 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (characterization of home as nonmarital
despite marital improvements and marital loan). But see Tucker v. Tucker, 368
N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (court looked to intent in division of
nonmarital property).
57. As discussed supra note 51, the Schmitz decision was a departure from the
exact language of Minnesota's statute. The Schmitz court quoted the applicable statimte and authority from other jurisdictions. It only dealt with the conflict between the
authorities by saying that it approved of the reasoning used in another jurisdiction.
Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d at 750. By not confronting the inequities within the statutory
language, the Schmitz court failed to provide direction for the lower courts.
58. MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subd. 5 (1986 & Supp. 1987); supra note 8.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss4/6

6

1988]

Strand:
Divorce Law—Equitable
Distribution
of Appreciated Nonmarital
Prop
OF NONMARITAL
PROPERTY
EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION

935

value attributable to the efforts of the parties' and passive increases
attributable to market variances. 59 The court of appeals, instead,
drew a distinction between "appreciation" (nonmarital) and "income" (marital).60 The conflict between the plain language of Minnesota's statute and the Schmitz, Brown and Faus decisions resulted in
varying lower court decisions.61
The Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to resolve this conflict
by deciding Nardini.62 In Nardini, the court addressed the question
of whether one-half of a business, owned by a couple for over thirty
years, could be characterized as a nonmarital asset. 63 Ralph Nardini
purchased a fifty percent interest in the predecessor business in 1949
for $2,500.64 Ralph and Marguerite Nardini were married in 1953.65
Marguerite worked as a bookkeeper for the company during the
early years of the marriage. 6 6 She raised the couple's two children,
kept their house and was active in numerous civic and charitable organizations.67 Ralph worked as a "key man" by recruiting customers
for the business.68 The couple acquired sole interest in the business
in 1956 for $12,000, and renamed it Nardini Fire Equipment Com69
pany (Nardini of Minnesota).
The Nardinis obtained a divorce decree on June 28, 1985.70 At
that time, Nardini of Minnesota was a successful corporation with
$563,598 of retained earnings.7t Nevertheless, the trial court ac59. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d at 750.
60. See, e.g., Linderman v. Linderman, 364 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
61. E.g., Riley v. Riley, 369 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (traceable assets classified as nonmarital); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 379 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985) (only twenty-five percent of appreciation of closely held business classified as marital property). But seeJohnson v.Johnson, 388 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Mnn. Ct.
App. 1986) ("Marital judgment governs decisions for spending or saving income of a
couple, and there is no rational basis for distinguishing the effects of that judgment
on income from different sources.")
62. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 184.
63. Id. at 190.
64. Nardini v. Nardini, 385 N.W.2d 339, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). At trial,
Mrs. Nardini testified that Ralph purchased a half interest in only a portion of the
predecessor business. Id. This seems likely as the Nardinis paid $12,500 for the rest
of the business only a few years later.
65. Nardini, 385 N.W.2d at 340.
66. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 186.
67. The supreme court found that these were contributions worthy of recognition. By assuming responsibility for their home and children, Marguerite enabled
Ralph to devote his energy to the business. Through her charitable and civic work,
Marguerite contributed to the goodwill of the company. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The valuation of the family business was also an issue on appeal. However,
the parties stipulated to retained earnings in the amount of $563,598. Id. at 195.
The supreme court stated that "income earned during the marriage, whether distrib-
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cepted Ralph's valuation of the company at $350,000, ignoring Marguerite's valuation of $725,000.72 The trial court found that Ralph

Nardini was entitled to one-half of Nardini of Minnesota as his
nonmarital property because he acquired that interest four years
prior to the marriage. 73 The remaining interest in the company
would be split equally between Ralph and Marguerite. 74 The court
also awarded Marguerite spousal maintenance of $1,200 per month
for five years based on its finding that she was capable of training and
employment. 75 The court of appeals affirmed, finding no error in
the lower court's decision. 76
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the conflicting authority which the trial court had faced. 7 7 Nevertheless, the
supreme court held the trial court had erred in assuming that because Ralph purchased a one-half interest in a business prior to the
marriage, his nonmarital interest should forever be one-half.78 The
court found that Ralph's $2,500 investment in 1949 had been
dwarfed by the overall success of the business. "[T]he record here
reveals that over the course of more than 31 years, the marital partnership reinvested in Nardini of Minnesota $565,598 of retained
earnings in addition to the $12,500 paid [for the remaining one-half
of the business]. . . "79 The supreme court stated that the present
value of the marital and nonmarital interests should be proportionate to the amounts of their respective investments, thereby apporuted or undistributed and reinvested in the business, is marital property." Id. The
court referred to the Commissioners' Note in the original draft of section 307 of the
UMDA as authority for this statement. Id. at 193.
72. The trial court did not explain this part of its decision. It merely accepted
Ralph Nardini's valuation amount. -The court of appeals affirmed, noting that "it is
within the trial court's discretion to choose one appraisal over another .. " Nardini,
385 N.W.2d at 342 (quoting Kostelnik v. Kostelnik, 367 N.W.2d 665, 669 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985)).
73. Nardini, 385 N.W.2d at 343.
74. Id.
75. Id. Despite the fact that Marguerite was fifty-five years old, had been married
thirty-one years, had only a high school education, had a skin disease, and had no
specific employment skills, the court was uncertain as to the necessity of a permanent
award. Subdivision 3 of section 518.552 of Minnesota Statutes requires permanent
awards in uncertain cases. However, because the statute had not been amended at
the time of trial, the court of appeals declined to enforce it. Id. at 344.
76. Id. at 344.
77. See supra note 58. The conflict was between the statute and the supreme
court's policy-oriented approach. The court stated that the simple language of the
statute was deceptive in light of the complex valuation problems involved in dissolution cases. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 191.
78. Id. at 195.
79. Id.
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tioning nearly the entire value of the business to the marital estate. 8 0
The supreme court held that the trial court had likewise erred in
its valuation of the family business. 8' The court found that the lower
court had failed to take into consideration the relevant facts and the
fundamental factors necessary for an accurate valuation of a closely
8 2
held corporation.
The court also held that the award of temporary maintenance
amounted to an abuse of discretion. 83 After applying the relevant
statutory criteria, the court found that Marguerite's chances for selfsufficiency were uncertain at best.84 Because the statute requires
80. Because of this, Ralph and Marguerite will share equally in the value of
Nardini of Minnesota. Id.
81. Id. at 199.
82. The trial court accepted Ralph's valuation of the closely-held corporation
(largely because of the persuasiveness of his attorney), and treated the transaction as
a forced liquidation of a business. The supreme court held this to be error, stating
that "the court must determine the value of the business as if the transaction were a
sale of the entire business by a willing seller to a willing buyer." Id. at 189.
The supreme court stated that the appropriate starting point for valuation of a
closely-held corporation may be its book value. It next enumerated eight factors
which must be considered before a reasonable valuation can be made:
1. The nature of the business and the history of the enterprise from its
inception.
2. The economic outlook in general and the condition and outlook of the
specific industry in particular.
3. The book value of the stock and the financial condition of the business.
4. The earning capacity of the company.
5. The dividend-paying capacity.
6. Whether or not the enterprise has goodwill or other intangible value.
7. Sales of the stock and the size of the block of the stock to be valued.
8. The market price of stocks of corporations engaged in the same or a
similar line of business having their stocks traded in a free and open market.
Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 190 (footnote omitted). These factors, borrowed from Revenue Ruling 59-60, are to be applied with "common sense, sound and informed judgment, and reasonableness ..
" Id. at 190. See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B. 237; See
also Nehorayoff v. Nehorayoff, 108 Misc. 2d 311, 437 N.Y.S. 2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981). See generally B. GOLDBERG, VALUATION OF DIVORCE ASSETS (Supp. 1987);
GOLDEN, supra note 7, § § 7.01-.14, at 206-32.
83. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 195.
84. Id. at 198. Subdivision 2 of section 518.552 provides that:
The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time,
either temporary or permanent, as the court deems just, without regard to
marital misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors including:
(a) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including
marital property apportioned to the party, and the party's ability to meet
needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support
of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to
enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment, and
the probability, given the party's age and skills, of completing education or
training and becoming fully or partially self-supporting;
(c) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) the duration of the marriage and, in the case of a homemaker, the
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that uncertainty be met with an award of permanent maintenance,85
the supreme court remanded the case for an award of permanent
spousal maintenance.86
Despite explicit statutory provisions,87 the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he allocation of Nardini of Minnesota between
marital and nonmarital interests rather understandably foundered
on the shoals of unchartered waters." 8 8 The court described the
statutory language as simplistic, and "out of harmony with the modern definition of property as a bundle of divisible rights .... 89 The
court found Minnesota's statute to be of little help in resolving the
complex questions encountered in marriage dissolution cases. 90 As
length of absence from employment and the extent to which any education,
skills, or experience have become outmoded and earning capacity has become permanently diminished;
(e) the loss of earnings, seniority, retirement benefits, and other employment opportunities foregone by the spouse seeking spousal maintenance;
(f) the age, and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance;
(g) the abilty of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet
needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(h) the contribution of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation, or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property, as
well as the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or in furtherance of the
other party's employment or business.
MINN. STAT. § 518.552, subd. 2 (1986).
The supreme court stressed the standard of living enjoyed by the Nardinis during their marriage. It asked the question: -[I]s the spouse seeking maintenance 'able
to provide adequate self-support, after considering the standard of living established
during the marriage and all relevant circumstances, through appropriate employment'?" Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 197 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 518.552, subd. l(b)). In
Marguerite Nardini's case, the answer was no. See, e.g., Krauskopf, Maintenance: A
Decade of Development, 50 Mo. L. REV. 259, 280 (Spring 1985), stating that "[a]fter a
long marriage at an upper class standard of living, in which wives devote their time to
assisting their husband's careers.., it would not be appropriate to expect that homemaker to obtain employment as a clerk in a discount store.
85. See MINN. STAT. § 518.552, subd. 3 (1986).
86. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 199. The court dismissed Ralph Nardini's contention
that subdivision 3 should not be applied retroactively. The court stated that subdivision 3 could be applied because it had not changed the intent of the statute; it had
merely corrected the statute's interpretation. Id. at 196; see MINN. STAT. § 518.552,
subd. 3 (1986).
87. The language of section 518.54 may be simplistic, but it is hardly ambiguous.
It states in rather straight-forward terms that the increase in value of nonmarital
property is to be characterized as nonmarital. MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subd. 5(c)
(1986). The court, however, apparently agreed with appellant's reasoning that the
legislature could not have intended that the statute be taken literally. See Brief for
Appellant at 12, Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184 (Minn. 1987) (No. 85-1421).
88. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 190.
89. Id. at 191.
90. The statute does not suggest that any allocation of appreciated nonmarital
property is necessary. However, the court regarded this merely as an oversight on
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an example, the court pointed to the lack of a distinction between
increases in value that occur prior to the marriage and increases that
occur during the marriage.9l There also was no distinction based
2
upon either the nature or the cause of the increase in value.9
Because of its dissatisfaction with the language of the statute, the
court turned to its own past decisions and to authority from other
jurisdictions. 93 The court stated that, "the terms 'acquired before
marriage' and 'increase' in the definition of nonmarital property
have generally been interpreted in a manner consonant with the policy underlying the dissolution statutes." 9 4 As an example, the court
cited the Schmitz, Brown and Faus cases. These decisions recognized
that an asset may be comprised of both marital and nonmarital interests. 9 5 They also recognized that increases in value attributable to
sums expended or to the efforts of the parties to nonmarital property should be marital in character.96
The Nardini decision was also based upon similar decisions in
other states. 9 7 The court cited several cases which were decided using the Schmitz apportionment rationale.98 Many of these cases were
decided in jurisdictions having statutes similar to subdivision 5 of
section 518.54.99 As justification for its decision, the court stated
that "[o]ther courts have made the distinction between increase in
value attributable to the efforts of the parties and that attributable to
external forces despite statutory language which appears to make no
such distinction." 100

Finally, the court attempted to resolve any remaining confusion in
the part of the statute's drafters. It assumed that the drafters intended courts to
perform allocation. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. By this statement, the court chose to treat Minnesota's statute as an exception to the general rule. Id. In fact, the statutory language is similar to that found in
the statutes of other states. The decision actually follows the lead of other jurisdictions by creating distinctions not found in the statute. See GOLDEN, supra note 7,
§ § 5.28-.32, at 124-31.
95. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 191.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 191-92.
98. Tibetts v. Tibetts, 406 A.2d 70, 74 (Me. 1979) ("[Ilt did not follow that where
a part of property exchanged was nonmarital, the entire property acquired was, as a
result, nonmarital."); In re Marriage of Herr, 705 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260 (1985). But see Bently v. Bently, 84
Ill. 2d 97, 101, 417 N.E.2d 1309, 1311 (1981) (all increase in nonmarital property is
nonmarital property).
99. See, e.g., McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 327 S.E.2d 910 (1985) (court
with statute similar to section 518.54 distinguished between increase in value attributable to the parties and those attributable to general economic conditions).
100. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192. See also Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 52, 601
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Minnesota's lower courts over the income/appreciation distinction.
The court stated that property is properly classified on an active/passive basis.tO' Increases in value which are attributable to
marital funds and marital efforts (active) constitute marital property. 10 2 Increases which are attributable to an increase in equity
through mortgage payments (active), also constitute marital property. l0 3 Increases in value which are attributable to inflation and
04
market forces (passive), however, constitute nonmarital property.1
The court's holding in Nardini marks a significant shift in marital
property distribution in Minnesota.' 0 5 The court confronted the
conflict which exists between Minnesota's dissolution statute and the
policies behind equitable distribution.106 The plain language of the
statute classifies any increase in value of nonmarital property as
nonmarital.107 That language is contrary to the policies behind equitable distribution legislation based on the model UMDA.108 These
policies treat marriage as a partnership to which each party contributes and from which each party should benefit.109 The Nardini court
exposed the inadequacies of Minnesota's distribution statute and the
plight of long-term spouses. 10
The Nardini decision, although not yet passed upon by the MinneP.2d 1334, 1336 (1979); Van Newkirk v. Van Newkirk, 212 Neb. 730, 733-34, 325
N.W.2d 832, 834 (1982); Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Nev. 301, 305, 468 P.2d 359, 364 (1970).
101. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192.
102. The court illustrated the distinctions through the use of a hypothetical dissolution. The hypothetical couple, John and Jane, owned real estate and stock prior to
their marriage. The property and stock had increased in value by the time of dissolution. The court applied its active/passive distinction to John and Jane's situation and
apportioned the appreciated property accordingly. Id. at 192-3. The court's illustration provides valuable insight to the court's active/passive distinction.
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id.
105. Prior decisions by the court failed to directly confront the inadequacies of the
statutory framework. E.g., Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d at 750. While the court in Nardinidid
not specifically request that the legislature redraft the statute, it did confront the
specific statutory problems. The court's opinion also provides potential drafters with
a framework from which to start. See Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 191-92.
106. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 191. The decision points out that the statutory language is contrary to the intent of the drafters of the original section 307 of the
UMDA. "The phrase 'increase in value' used in subsection (b)(5) is not intended to
cover the income from property acquired prior to marriage." This is so whether the
income is distributed or reinvested. UMDA § 307, Comment at 204 (1970).

107.

MINN. STAT.

§ 518.54, subd. 5 (1986 & Supp. 1987).

108. "[T]he extent to which each of the parties contributes to the marriage is not
measurable only by the amount of money contributed to it during its period of endurance but, rather, by the whole complex of financial and nonfinancial components
contributed." Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192 (quoting Wood v. Wood, 119 Misc.2d
1076, 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)).
109. See id.
110. By failing to recognize appreciation which results through the efforts of the
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sota legislature, has helped to eliminate much of the inequity in Minnesota property distribution law."'I The court applied the facts of
the case to authority from other jurisdictions and to the principles
behind the UMDA and drafted a well-reasoned opinion."t 2 Under
the Nardini holding, spouses can expect to be compensated for their
contributions to a marriage.
The decision reflects the modern view of marriage as a partnership
of equals."t 3 It recognizes that both spouses contributed to the success of the business during their marriage.'t4 Ralph Nardini invested $2,500 of his nonmarital funds into the business in 1949; 115
the couple reinvested the company's profits and their personal efforts into the business over the following thirty-two years.1 6 It
would have been grossly unfair to allow Ralph Nardini to exclude
one-half of the business as his nonmarital asset.
Nardini v. Nardini reflects the court's intent to favor equitable distribution of property. The supreme court's decision establishes
guidelines for the valuation and allocation of appreciated property."l 7 The decision is also significant because it recognizes the legislatulre's intent to favor permanent awards of maintenance for longterm homemakers.' 18 Practitioners must weigh the facts of each case
in light of the factors enumerated in the court's decision before embarking on settlements and litigation.
parties during a long-term marriage, the statute disregards the rights of the longterm homemaker who did not directly acquire the property. Id.
111. The Nardini decision rewards each party for contributions made during the
marriage. This is ultimately more equitable than distributing property on the basis of
when it was acquired. See Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192.
112. Id.
113. Nardini should have been easy to decide. The parties' long-term marriage
and the proportion of the nonmarital assets to the marital reinvestments compelled
the supreme court's holding. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 186-87.
114. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 192. Each spouse contributed in his and her own way
through fulfillment of "traditional" roles. See Note, supra note 7, at 121. "The decision for one spouse to work at earning wages and for the other spouse to care for a
home and children is a decision jointly made. However, upon divorce, the burden of
the joint decision is disproportionately borne by the wife." Id.
115. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 186.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 190-195. See also supra notes 82, 102.
118. Nardini effectively overrules McClelland v. McClelland, 359 N.W.2d 7 (Minn.
1984); and Abuzzahab v. Abuzzahab, 359 N.W.2d 12 (Minn. 1984) (reserving permanent awards for "exceptional cases"). See Nardini, 414 N.W.2d at 199. The McClelland and Abuzzahab decisions were contrary to the legislature's intent to favor
permanent awards of maintenance. See Testimony of Senator Berglin before the SenateJudiciary Committee cited in Oliphant, Maintenance and Rehabilitative Alimony, 1985 MINN.
FAM. L. INST. 220, 221. Senator Berglin was the original author of section 518.552 in
1978. She testified that the legislature had not intended to deprive long-term homemakers of permanent maintenance.
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Obviously, it is not yet known whether the Minnesota legislature
will accept the reasoning of the Nardini court and make the necessary
statutory changes. The supreme court has, however, taken a significant step. The Nardini court not only achieved a fair result, it also set
an important precedent in Minnesota divorce law.
David R. Strand
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